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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA  
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT  
DIVISION FIVE

**CHENG CHENG SU,**

**Plaintiff and Appellant,**

**A096615**

**v.**

**(Alameda County  
Super. Ct. No. 832148-6)**

**EDUARDO M. XAVIER,**

**Defendant and Respondent.**

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Appellant Cheng Cheng Su contends the trial court erred when it dismissed her civil suit seeking damages for fraud and deceit. We disagree and will affirm the judgment.

**I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND**

The facts of this dispute are not set forth clearly in the record that has been provided. As best as we can tell, appellant lives in a condominium complex in Berkeley. She apparently had some sort of dispute with the homeowners' association for the complex over fees that had been assessed. When the dispute was not resolved, the homeowners' association, through its attorney, respondent Eduardo M. Xavier, obtained a judgment representing the unpaid fees.

Appellant then filed a complaint against Xavier in the Alameda County Superior Court. The complaint is not a model of pleading. Construed liberally, appellant seems to allege that Xavier had obtained the underlying judgment by fraud.

Appellant's case was set for a case management conference on March 15, 2001. As part of that process, appellant was obligated by local rule to prepare a case management statement.

Appellant did not prepare a case management statement prior to the March 15 hearing. Therefore, the court continued the hearing to April 27, 2001. Again, the court ordered appellant to prepare a case management statement. In addition, the court ordered appellant to show cause why her complaint should not be dismissed because she had failed to prepare such a statement.

Again, appellant did not prepare a case management statement prior to the April 27 hearing. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed appellant's suit. That same date, April 27, 2001, the clerk of the Alameda Superior Court entered respondent's default because he had not filed an answer. Subsequently the trial court set aside the default because the complaint had been dismissed. This appeal followed.

## II. DISCUSSION

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it dismissed her suit. Her entire argument on this point is as follows: "The Judge Gordon Baranco shouldn't dismiss Plaintiff's entire action. This is because Plaintiff had pursuant to CCP 585(d), or (b), [or] (c), 989 and 415, etc to file ENTRY OF DEFAULT against Defendant."

We reject appellant's argument for two reasons. First, it is unintelligible. "An appellate court is not required to examine undeveloped claims, nor to make arguments for parties." (*Paterno v. State of California* (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.)

Second, to the extent we can understand appellant's argument, it is unpersuasive. Appellant seems to contend the court should not have dismissed her suit because the clerk had entered Xavier's default. However all litigants, including those acting in propria persona, are obligated to comply with local rules of court. (*Wantuch v. Davis* (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786, 794-795; see also Code Civ. Proc. § 575.2, subd (a).) If a party fails to comply with those rules, the court may impose sanctions including dismissing a plaintiff's suit. (*Wantuch v. Davis, supra*, at p. 795; Code Civ. Proc., § 575.2, subd. (a).) Here the trial court acted well within the scope of its discretion when it dismissed

appellant's suit because she had failed to follow the local rules. The entry of Xavier's default was irrelevant to this determination.

### III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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Jones, P.J.

We concur:

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Stevens, J.

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Gemello, J.